Course #: V83.0076

Summer 2010, Session 2 (June 28th-August 6th)
Monday-Thursday, 3:30–5:05pm
Place: TBA

Description:
Despite its title, this course will have little to do with the nature of Belief and Truth. It will touch upon the nature of Knowledge, but only tangentially. Instead, the main focus will be on the nature of Rationality and Objectivity. The course will be split into two parts. In the first part we will talk about Skepticism, the view on which we know nothing (or close to nothing) about the world. We will spend most of our time examining and trying to respond to the most powerful Skeptical arguments that seem to show that none of our beliefs about the world are even reasonable. This will lead us to discuss broader issues about the rationality of our beliefs, which will be our springboard for talking about objectivity. In the second part of the course we will try to get a better understanding of what objectivity is, whether there are any objective facts and whether we can have objective reasons to believe anything. I will also be open to exploring some additional topics, depending on the interests of the class.

This course has no prerequisites. No background in philosophy is assumed. The topics may vary, depending on the interest of the class.

Schedule: coming soon.

Instructor:
Eli Alshanetsky (alshanetsky@nyu.edu)
Office: Rm 305, Dept. of Philosophy (5 Washington Place)
Office Hours: TBA
Requirements:
Participation (20%), 4 short writing assignments (80%).
Books:
Richard Feldman, Epistemology.
Paul Boghossian. Fear of Knowledge.
Other readings will be handed out in class and will be posted on the course Blog.

Useful Resources:
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/index.html
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/page/home

Choose one of the three constructivist theses discussed in Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge (i.e. constructivism about facts/justification/rational-explanation). Explain the thesis of your choice and say how it bears on the doctrine of “Equal Validity.” Present what you take to be the most powerful argument for the constructivist thesis (you may present one of the arguments discussed in the book or make up your own argument). Is it a good argument? Why/why not?

1. Present Nozick’s Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge (Feldman, pg. 87-91). What are the advantages of Nozick’s theory over the Causal Theory? Explain Kripke’s objection to the Tracking Theory (the one having to do with “absurd distinctions”). Is there any way of defending the theory against this objection?

2. Formulate Goldman’s version of Reliabilism (Feldman, pg. 90-99). Make sure to explain all the technical terms that figure in the definition. Use examples (more than one!) to illustrate the theory. Present the Brain in a Vat Objection to Reliabilism. Come up with at least one Reliabilist response to this objection.

3. Reconstruct (as best as you can) Descartes’ Dreaming Argument for Skepticism (from Meditation I). Drawing on Stroud’s discussion in “The Problem of the External World” (pg. 14-16), evaluate the “straightforward” response to the argument, on which we can sometimes know that we are not dreaming.

4. Present Moore’s Proof of an External World. How does it constitute a defense against Skepticism? Do you find the proof convincing? Why (or why not)? How would a Skeptic respond to this proof?

Jim Pryor, What’s So Bad About Living in the Matrix.

Hubert Dreyfus, Telepistemology: Descartes’ Last Stand.

1. Formulate and explain the Cartesian version of Foundationalism. Present one (of the three) objections to Cartesian Foundationalism discussed by Feldman (pg. 55-60). Then either (i) defend Cartesian Foundationalism from this objection or (ii) show how Modest Foundationalism avoids this objection. (If you choose (ii), make sure to explain what Modest Foundationalism is).

2. Present and evaluate BonJour’s “TIF argument” against Foundationalism (Feldman, pg. 75—77). Make sure to discuss at least one Foundationalist response and say whether you find this response convincing (and why).

3. Towards the end of his article “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, Sellars writes:

I do wish to insist that the metaphor of “foundation” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former.

Reconstruct (as best as you can) Sellars’ argument for this claim. Why does he think that our knowledge of observational facts (expressed by sentences such as “this is green”) presupposes that we know general facts of the form “X is a reliable symptom of Y” (or that utterances of “this is green” are reliable indicators of the existence of green objects in the proximity of speaker)? Why does Sellars say that the metaphor of “foundation” is misleading?

1. Explain and motivate the No Defeaters theory of knowledge. What are the advantages of the No Defeaters theory over the traditional analysis of knowledge? Come up with your own counterexample to the No Defeaters theory (you can use Feldman’s examples on pages 34-35 as a guide). Is there a way to revise the No Defeaters theory that makes it immune to counterexamples?

2. In section IV of The Will to Believe, William James writes: “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine  option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave the question open,” is itself a passional decision,–just like deciding yes or no,–and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.” Explain what James means by this claim. How does it constitute an argument against Clifford’s thesis, i.e. that “it is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence”? What do you think about this argument? Are we ever forced to decide between two beliefs that cannot “be decided on intellectual grounds”?

Course #: V83.0076

Summer 2009, Session 2 (June 29th-August 7th)
Monday-Thursday, 3:30–5:05pm
Place: TBA

Description:
In this course we’ll inquire into the nature of inquiry. Questions will include: What is it, exactly, to know something? Is our knowledge built on foundations? Can we know anything about the world beyond our mental states (how do we know that we’re not in a Matrix or that the people around us have minds)? Is knowledge, in some sense, socially constructed? Is certainty attainable? What is it to be rational? Is there an objective fact of the matter as to who is rational and who is not? Throughout the course we will read some selections from historical texts (e.g. by Plato, Descartes, Pascal and William James), but spend most of our time discussing contemporary authors.

This course has no prerequisites. No background in philosophy is assumed. The topics may vary, depending on the interest of the class.

Schedule: coming soon.

Instructor:
Eli Alshanetsky (alshanetsky@nyu.edu)
Office: Rm 305, Dept. of Philosophy (5 Washington Place)
Office Hours: TBA
Requirements:
Participation (20%), 4 short writing assignments (80%).
Books:
Richard Feldman, Epistemology.
Paul Boghossian. Fear of Knowledge.
Other readings will be handed out in class and will be posted on the course Blog.

Useful Resources:
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/index.html
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/page/home